paratus for abstracting significant elements of logical form from natural language arguments and everyday discourse.
So, for example, the following argument is valid, and this is by virtue o f its having a certain logical form, depicted to its right.
A. 1) If you are illiterate
A' 1') If I, not R you are not reading. 2) You are illiterate.
2') I_________ Therefore, 3) you 3') Not R are not reading.
The fact that statements (2) and (3) are false does not affect the validity of the argument: If (2) as well as (1) were true, (3) would have to be true. Of course, (A) is not seriously intended as an argument in the sense of an attempt to con vince you of its conclusion. Not all good arguments are meant to convince or to persuade. In any case, whether we regard (A) as a serious or interesting argu ment does not change the logical connection between statements (1) and (2) and statement (3): (1) and (2) together logically imply or entail (3). Moreover, what is of interest about this connection is that any statements having the forms (1') and (2') would together logically imply a statement of the form (3')-
In the following argument the premises and conclusion all happen to be true: Close your eyes and the conclusion, statement (5), is false, while the premises remain true. Hence, this argument is invalid. But not just because of any accident or fact about the world that momentarily renders the conclusion false while the premises are true. It is invalid so far as the logical form of the argument (B') fails to guarantee a true conclusion, given true premises. We know this about the argument form (B ') irrespective of anything we may know about the truth-value of the particular claims asserted in argument (B). Argu ment form (B') fails to guarantee the truth of its conclusion, given true premises, if any argument of that form can have true premises and yet a false conclusion. Knowing nothing about you or the truth of statements (4) and (5), I know that argument (B) is invalid so fa r as its relevant logical form, say (B'), is the same as the following argument's, (C'): Demonstrate the fact as you will, any argument whose relevant form is the same as (B ') or (C ') is invalid so far as it is evidently possible for an argument of that form to have true premises and a false conclusion.
Formal Symbolic Logic
Deductive logic is 'formal' insofar as it typically attributes validity or invalidity to logical form and looks to discover rules governing the use of those logical ex pressions that are crucial to the logical form of arguments. For example, the crucial elements of logical form singled out in the previous arguments-were the sentential connective 'i f and the negation term 'not'. The validity or in validity of those arguments-can be accounted for by the way sentences in the argument were constructed and combined using 'i f and 'not'. Formal logic is typically symbolic if only because it is practically conven ient (for purposes, say, of easy pattern recognition and formal manipulation) to depict crucial logical elements of natural language in some tractable standard notation. Even with simple conditional statements it is convenient to reduce the logical force or import of the variety of conditionalizing expressions found in ordinary language to some standard, precisely definable and tractable symbolic form.
Symbolic logic provides tools not only for construing the validity or in validity of arguments but also for sorting out a variety of claims about what 'follows logically' from what. It can be useful to understand the purely logical form and import of statements, quite apart from knowing their truth or falsity-especially when the matter at hand is controversial, the truth of the matter is elusive, and one is not sure what to believe.
For example: Suppose a person is wondering whether a human fetus can be shown to have a right to life. She is not at all sure what to believe on this somewhat metaphysical issue, but she does think that, unless it turns out that a fetus has no right to life, abortion is wrong. In any case she cannot help feeling that abortion is just not right. A quarrelsome friend then claims that she is ef fectively committed to a position on the right-to-life issue after all, and had bet ter face up to it. That is, he claims in effect that propositions (9) and (10) logically commit her to (12), as follows: D. 9) Unless it's the case that fetuses have no right to life, abortion is not right. But 10) abortion isn't right. Therefore, 11) it's not the case that fetuses have no right to life i.e., 12) fetuses do have a right to life
Is it true that she is logically committed to believe (12) if she believes (9) and (10)? Do (9) and (10) logically entail (12)? Is (D) a valid deduction? Suppose her friend, while trying to argue for abortion and raise doubts in her mind about (10) by capitalizing on her doubts about (12), holds that abor tion is not wrong unless fetuses have a right to life. But, he must confess, he thinks fetuses do have a right to life. She presses the point that he must, then, logically concede that abortion is wrong, on the following deduction: D '. 9') Unless not R, not A 10') Not A IT ) Not not R 12') R E. 13) Unless fetuses have a right to E '. 13') Unless R, not W life, abortion is not wrong.
12') R_____________ But, 12) fetuses do have a right to life. So, 14) abortion is wrong.
Is she right?
The foregoing hypothetical dispute is not about the truth or falsity of statements about the rights of fetuses or the rights and wrongs of abortion. It is rather about the logical connections among the propositions in question. The dispute hangs in part on some conditional connection, (9) or ( (The argument just given is one case on which to argue that a sentence of the form, 'Not P unless Q' should be construed as equivalent to 'P only if Q' and not as 'P if Q' or even *P if and only if Q \ Since the proper interpretation of 'unless' is often context dependent, this is not the whole story for the interpreta tion of 'unless'; but granting some ambiguity or context-dependence to the logical force of an expression does not gainsay the value o f symbolic logic for helping to sort it out.) Deductive logic, formal and symbolic, is concerned with discovering and demonstrating various sorts of logical form and logical connectedness, such as define the validity/invalidity of arguments, the relation of logical implication or consequence, and familiar properties such as consistency/inconsistency and logical dependence/independence. Judgments about these sorts of formal logical relations seem to play an important role in everyday reasoning and argu ment, as well as in more rigorous mathematical reasoning. Since these logical relations are conveniently defined and studied with the aid of symbolic nota tion, symbolic deductive logic is one thing we might teach-say, to improve the deductive components of critical reasoning skills, or as a model of logical rigor and precision. We often deal with the question of whether a claim is warranted simply by considering whether 'good reasons' or 'good evidence' can be given for it, without bothering to construct elaborate, let alone formally valid arguments. What constitutes 'good reason' or 'good evidence' for accepting a given claim may depend on the norms of the field in which the claim is made, and so con stitute part of a specialized discipline. For example: Is the reason that doing x will conduce to a greater amount of happiness for a greater number of people than any alternative action a good reason to believe that x is the moral thing to do? This is a question for moral theory and epistemology.
T

Non-deductive Logic
There is, however, a lot of generalizable wisdom about what constitutes good or bad inference and argument. This wisdom about ordinary reasoning, subjected to a certain amount of systematic and theoretical scrutiny is typically taught under rubrics like "informal logic," "fallacies," and "inductive logic." Informal-logical norms may be operating where we detect that arguments are quite bad, even though valid (as above), and where we detect that arguments are perfectly good, even though they neither are expressly valid nor even want to be. The following example is adapted from Grice. Assuming that Jack and Jill are observing certain maxims of conversational im plication (or 'implicature'), Jill may be taken to have made some perfectly legitimate inferences (e.g., that Jack was referring to car trouble, isn't in a rush to get home, etc.) and to have offered Jack, in effect, a very good argument for not hailing a ride home yet.
Informal Logic
Whatever the norms that make Jill's tacit inferences and elliptical argu ment good or 'logical', they are not simply form al deductive ones. It is quite another matter whether the reasoning implicit in (H )-its tacit assumptions and conclusions, including the operative maxims of conversational logic-is really a tacitly valid deduction, or, in any case, best reconstructed in valid deductive form for full appraisal and analysis: It can be argued that formal logic plays an important role in the explication of conversational 'implicatiires'. 9 'Informal logic' covers quite a range of non-formal factors governing or dinary, everyday reasoning. Johnson and Blair have discussed the difficulties of defining this field of logical studies, and explore its importance as a field of logic distinct from formal, symbolic logic.10 Exploration and codification of the norms governing this diverse territory-semantics, informal fallacy, pragmatics, notions of relevance, and good evidence-is in any case one direc tion 'logical' studies can take. One venerable tradition has it that deductive arguments can be spotted by virtue of having 'general' premises and 'specific' or 'particular' conclusions, whereas the converse is true for inductive arguments. But this view is both mistaken and irrelevant to the assessment of the evidentiary connection of either sort of argument.11
Inductive Logic
The view that arguments come somehow pre-classified into the world, born either as deductive or inductive (as animals are born either male or female) with or without certain birth defects (like invalidity or a weak evidentiary con nection) is as misleading as it may be popular. Many arguments are recognizable as intentional or typical paradigms of deductive or inductive arguments, especially those designed as such for textbooks. These arguments' authors clearly intend their arguments to be appraised by one sort of criteria (deductive) or another (inductive). Most arguments we meet everyday are authored by people who either don't know of any distinctions among eviden tiary connections or do not have one in mind. The intention of the author of an argument is, in any case, not a matter of logic, and it may or may not be a rele vant factor in trying to evaluate an argument. Whatever the intentions of their authors, most arguments in ordinary settings need to be reconstructed and filled out a bit before they can be suitably evaluated. In many cases, whether to reconstruct an argument with expressly deductive or inductive pretentions is a matter of choice, a policy decision that can hark to various purposes of evalua tion and may well disregard the intentions of the author.
The question, ultimately, is not so often 'What sort of argument is this'? but rather 'How are we to explicate, reconstruct and evaluate this argument-according to deductive canon? or inductive? or some other? or some combination'? The answer to this question will depend on our purposes, and on normat' nee of argument taxinductive logic, broadly construed, is at least concerned with criteria for evaluating the strength of evidentiary connections that obtain in the absence of deductive validity, connections between the premises and conclusion of an argument that need not be made deductively valid in order to provide some evidentiary suport for the conclusion of the argument. Inductive logic in a more narrow and familiar sense is concerned with a specific sort of non-deductive evidentiary connection, inductive probability: When the premises of a good in ductive argument are true, they do not guarantee the truth o f the conclusion, as onomies T in a valid deductive argument, but lend it some degree o f probability.
Unlike deductive validity, the conditional warrant or evidentiary connec tion provided by good inductive arguments, probability, can vary in strength. As with purportedly deductive arguments, whether this evidentiary connection obtains or not, and to what degree, is not a function o f the truth-value of the premises. But, unlike the case of deductive arguments, it does not seem to be accountable to the logical form of the argument either.12 This may be illustrated by examples from a familiar family of inductive argument: arguments that generalize or extrapolate from past observations about some class of phenomena to predictions or conclusions about future or yet unobserved cases of the kind. Inferences of this sort of course underlie in numerable everyday expectations: that day will break again tomorrow, that ob jects will fall when dropped, that toothpaste will come out when we squeeze the tube, etc. Here's a prosaic example of an inductive argument that, clear to commonsense, provides perfectly good warrant for its conclusion, even though this is not so by virtue of any obvious construal of its logical form: Taking some liberty with Goodman's example, I will take something to be grue just in case either it has already been examined and is green all over or it is as yet unexamined and is blue all over. We assume that there is no problem in principle in making inferences about complex, disjoint contrary properties; for so far has had the property of being burning hot to the touch. Therefore, it's likeythat 30) every emerald yet unexamined is grue.
While the truth of (J)'s premise is no evidence whatever for the likelihood of its conclusion, matters are even worse with (K): (K)'s premise actually provides overwhelming evidence that its conclusion is false. This is Goodman's paradox: Contrary to what constitutes a good argument, if (K)'s premise is true, then it is (overwhelmingly) likely that its conclusion is false. (K)'s premise is true: Every emerald examined so far has been grue, because it has, of course, been examin ed and is green all over. And precisely because every emerald so far examined has been green (and, hence, grue) we reasonably expect that no emerald yet unexamined is grue (and, hence, blue): We reasonably expect that every emerald yet unexamined is in fact green, not blue (and, hence, not grue). What's gone wrong with argument (K), which seems to be of a form with (I) (which in its own right seems quite strong) is a serious puzzle for the theory of inductive inference. What makes inductively construed arguments demonstrably good or bad can be a matter for much philosophical head-scratching and a matter for rather technical, specialized study in inductive logic. It is surely a generally relevant logical study in its own right, and even one in which formalization of arguments can play a crucial role (as Wesley Salmon's paper in this volume illustrates so well).
Clearly, there is quite a variety of approaches to teaching 'logic' if only because there is such a variety of norms and issues regarding what counts as good argument or logical thinking. I have provided a bit of illustration to sug gest some key points of relevance for the common approaches broadly surveyed above. Points of relevance can surely be found for all of them, and others. But priorities among the learning objectives to which they are respectively relevant are surely arguable; and questions about either the theoretical adequacy or practical utility of any of these appoaches on the introductory level abound. Difficult trade-offs are apt to be required, on the introductory level and within the span of a single term course, among comprehensiveness in surveying salient approaches, theoretical competence, rigor, and applicability in practice.
The more precise and theoretically scrupulous an approach, the less handy or obviously practical it can be for improving everyday reasoning. And vice versa. The unique superiority of any one approach would be hard to establish, since none is an all-purpose logic and there is no indisputably supreme educa tional or reasoning objective for which one approach is uniquely suitable. The shared objective of distinguishing good reasoning or argument from bad is complex and ill-defined.
Where critical, theoretical understanding of logical norms is wanted for their scrupulous or correct application, surveys of an array of approaches run the danger of being theoretically facile, as well as ineffective for teaching prac tical, transferable skills. Teaching critical scruples and enhancing certain logical sensibilities, short of facilitating actual reasoning skills, is perhaps a worthy goal in its own right; but not one that by itself will dictate one approach over another. It is not surprising that rational^for taking any one approach or mix of approaches to teaching logical thinking often default, at bottom, to the tastes, preferences or customs of individual instructors. Strong rationales can be given for promoting-or demoting-various ap proaches to teaching logic or logical reasoning, as papers contained or cited in this volume attest. While we have not really begun widely and systematically to confront the empirical issues attending the question of what in the way of logic is best to teach for liberal educational purposes (as Thomas Tomko reminds us in his paper on assessing formal logical competence), we probably have not at tended enough to the value-theoretic disputes as to what those educational pur poses ought to be or what in practical terms they mandate.
Among the objectives of logic instruction competing for priority at the crossroads of liberal education today are certain incommensurables: These in clude various orders of theoretic understanding, on one hand, and the improve ment of skill in "everyday" argument on another. Even the tools and skills taught in the classical trivium were not aimed exclusively at quotidian intellec tual tasks; the trivium was preparatory for the higher, theoretic learning of the day as well. Of course, when the classical trivium was fashioned, the problem of practical relevance (to say nothing of shrinking enrollments) was not a preoc cupation. Needless to say, times and exigencies have changed. But we neglect the classically "liberal" goals of theoretic understanding and rigor at some peril.
The Limitations and Utility o f Formal Deductive Logic
The emphasis in this volume on formal logic or the formalization of inference and argument (be it deductive or inductive) is intended not only as a conten tious bias but also as a re-examination of the presumption of formal logic to merit a prominent place at the crossroads o f liberal learning. This seems timely in view of the growing interest in "informal" logic and the understandable desire to render logical training relevant to argumentation in practical life. In particular, the utility of formal deductive logic is perhaps in danger of being underestimated as liberal arts curricula strive, however admirably, to develop everyday practical or professional relevance. Against the developing diversity of approaches to teaching logic for liberal educational purposes, and against the diversity of arguably "liberal" educational goals-not all of which are con cerned with everyday argument or quotidian issues-I wish simply to invite reconsideration of the utility of formal deductive logic, particularly in its elementary symbolic guise. (Elsewhere in this volume I try to provide more ex tended argument and illustration respecting the claim of formal symbolic logic to a place at the crowded crossroads of higher learning.) The objective of formal reconstruction need not be to throw an argument out of court for being "invalid." Nor is the point merely to perform an act of charity in behalf of an argument's author, in order to be true to the author's in tentions or to maximize the argument's presumption to persuasiveness. The ob jective need not be simply to adjudicate either the validity or persuasive strength of the argument-especially since it is not at all clear that these two properties are, often enough, happily related.
Framing a position in the form of a valid deductive argument will as often reveal weakness as enhance soundness or persuasiveness: Previously unstated premises wanted for validity may often be obviously unacceptable. While con structing valid arguments can require great ingenuity and logical acuity, it is in theory a trivial matter: All manifestly circular arguments are manifestly valid. Constructing a manifestly sound argument is another matter, requiring more than deductive ingenuity and validity. Not all valid, nor even all sound arguments, are rationally convincing: The premises of a valid argument may in fact be true but not evidently so or even plausible. Sound arguments may also be question-begging. Further, not all rationally convincing arguments need be deductive, let alone valid. Hence, the persuasive function of valid deductive argument is far from obviously its strong point.
There are, for example, several coherent alternative positions pro and con the permissibility of abortion. One clear way of defining any one of them is to frame it in the form of a valid deductive argument showing just what conclu sion one wants to advocate on the basis of exactly what premises. Oftentimes, when students are forced to do this, they find that their actual position is not what they thought it to be. They may find, for example, that they cannot get the conclusion they want on the basis of the assumptons they are willing to make. To that extent they really do not know what position they hold. Skill at constructing manifestly valid deductive arguments can help one to get clear on his own or another's purported position.
Often, then, an argument, as well as its author, is sufficiently unclear as to exactly what wants to be assumed or concluded, that the prime objective in argument reconstruction is not to render the argument more persuasive, but rather more modestly analytical and exploratory: For example, to -discover what sorts or forms of assumption are necessary or sufficient to support a given conclusion within the overriding constraint of evident validity. That the war ranty of validity employed is system-relative does not gainsay the heuristic utili ty of the enterprise. This enterprise, played against other non-formal con straints (e.g., plausibility of premises, immunity to counter-example), is to make presumed yet unclear logical connections as precise and explicit as possi ble, to see what strategic options are open, and to tease out the relevant issues lying quietly within the alternative or tacit assumptions of an argument.
Here some elementary formal constraints are surely better than none. The fact that there is no one way to parse, paraphrase or reconstruct an argument does not mean that there are no instructive ways, or no guidelines for the analysis of arguments within the constraint of some evidently valid deductive form. 23 Error in ordinary deductive reasoning is accountable to several factors (semantic, pragmatic) besides being untutored in the standard formalities of deductive logic.24 But, vulnerability to many sorts of elementary deductive er ror and logical confusion in ordinary reasoning contexts can be readily diminished by some elementary logical tutoring. 25 Not all deductive reasoning contexts are ordinary, however. Some require more reflective logical care and stricter formalities than others: for example, contexts of philosophic reasoning and argument. Here we want more explicit formal artifice and resort to stricter logical legislation than in ordinary or every day argument.
For purposes of modeling reasoning tasks that require something stricter than ordinary conversational conventions, symbolic logic provides a useful discipline. One practical objection to teaching symbolic logic is the time re quired to learn its new and abstract language. But with properly programmed instruction this task can be made easy if not even enjoyable. There is practical advantage to learning some formalizing artifice: for explicitly formulating presumed or ambiguous logical connections, for abstracting from the rich variety and ambiguity of ordinary language expressions, for sorting out the logical force of assertions, for putting some semblance of clear logical structure into arguments, for trying to see beyond those distracting features of the con tent and context of arguments that commonly lead to logical error and confu sion.
Again The question here is whether any incompatibility between ordinary construals of conditionals and this piece of logical legislation makes any difference to the usefulness of standard elementary logic for disciplining the logical con struction or reconstruction of arguments in expressly valid form. We might also worry about whether construing all conditionals as material conditionals does not in effect legislate in many cases that the false shall be true.
Of course, one may seek consolation in various apologia for material con ditionality. For example, while it may seem odd to call the following statement true under the specified truth-conditions, it does not seem odd to allow that it at least is not false under any of the given conditions. Thus: What may be odd is to insist that all conditional statements be either true or false, rather than to allow that some can be neither or of no account. Can we not be assured in any case that the logic in question will not make true statements out of false ones, even if it makes true statements out of no/i-false ones?
Or Understanding the logic of sentential connectives, truth-functionally con strued, allows us, if anything, to be more critical and scrupulous in our use of language. To be able to make-and make artful use o f-the distinction be tween the truth-functional force of an expression and its other dimensions of meaning is only to be more discerning, to appreciate the richer dimensions of natural language not capured in the more precise confines of our logical ar tifice. There is no reason that formal logic cannot be taught so as to enhance rather than confound one's understanding of natural language.
That a bit o f elementary deductive logic can help obviate, legislate or sort out logical confusions in ordinary or philosophic contexts is not gainsaid by the discrepancies between formal and natural language. The truth-functional force of a conditional statement is of course no more the sum of its possible in teresting interpretations than the validity of an argument is the sum of its possi ble virtues. To adapt a line from e. e. cummings30: Who pays attention only to the logic of things will never wholly understand you. Who pays any attention to the logic of things will discern that I have done an injustice to cumming's line in more ways than one, but will also discern that formal logic can be as essential to understanding (even poetry) as it is insufficient.
Concluding Remarks
While it may be granted that elementary formal logic imposes significant con straints on what or how subtly we can argue within its precise but artificial con fines, formal logical judgments pervade ordinary reasoning, formal concepts of logical consequence, consistency, etc., inform all critical thinking, and educated persons need to come to grips with these crucial formal notions in some reflective, explicit and rigorous if critical fashion. Artificially imposed formal constraints (like manifest validity) can, moreover, be useful as heuristic devices for discovering or limiting the search for important objects of analytical inquiry (like 'hidden' assumptions of 'underlying' normative principles). The notion of a 'heuristic' to which I appeal here is perhaps best defined in the problem-solving literature.31 I take it that, while elementary formal logic can provide neither precise algorythmic techniques for the reconstruction of arguments in evidently valid form nor unique uncontestable results, it can pro vide useful, even indispensable, heuristic constraints (as Thomas Schwartz and I attempt, respectively, to illustrate elsewhere in this volume).
Formal validity can be a useful constraint in the reconstruction and analysis of arguments because of the way it forces one to try to be explicit about presumed and questionable joeical connectons. It is what can be learned in the attempt, not always the adequacy of the final product, that I emphasize in teaching formal deductive tools and techniques, applied to philosophic arguments, at an elementary level.
While I take some formal artifice to be better than none, especially when wrestling with philosophic arguments, what manner of artifice is best is another, quite arguable matter. Useful formalization of arguments and eviden tiary connections is not limited to deductive logic (as Wesley Salmon's paper in this volume illustrates); nor is standard first-order predicate logic the only or suitable choice. (Thomas Schwartz argues for a powerful version o f the Venndiagrammatic approach in his paper; and Patrick Suppes points the way for a context-free grammatical analysis of logical form.) Moreover, formal logical competence is hardly tantamount to the ability to translate fragments of natural language into an artificial language for purposes of purely formal manipulation (as is clear from Robert Ennis' exploration of the concept).
Whatever formal artifice and formal logical theory one chooses to teach, the choice must hark to the specific reasoning tasks one wants to instruct and to specific educational goals. It is the burden of the other papers in this volume to explore, in more detail than I provide here, instructive roles for formal logic among the liberal arts, against a variety of liberal learning goals. 
